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Counterfactual reasoning is a hallmark of human thought, enabling the capacity to shift
from perceiving the immediate environment to an alternative, imagined perspective.
Mental representations of counterfactual possibilities (e.g., imagined past events or future
outcomes not yet at hand) provide the basis for learning from past experience, enable
planning and prediction, support creativity and insight, and give rise to emotions and
social attributions (e.g., regret and blame). Yet remarkably little is known about the
psychological and neural foundations of counterfactual reasoning. In this review, we
survey recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicating that counterfactual
thought depends on an integrative network of systems for affective processing,
mental simulation, and cognitive control. We review evidence to elucidate how these
mechanisms are systematically altered through psychiatric illness and neurological
disease. We propose that counterfactual thinking depends on the coordination
of multiple information processing systems that together enable adaptive behavior
and goal-directed decision making and make recommendations for the study of
counterfactual inference in health, aging, and disease.
Keywords: counterfactual thought, mental simulation, adaptive behavior, clinical disorders
Introduction
‘‘Without considering alternatives to reality, we must accept the past as having been inevitable and
must believe that the future will be no different from the past. The generation of counterfactuals
gives us the flexibility in thinking about possible futures and prepares us better for those futures’’
(Johnson and Sherman, 1999, p. 150).
Humans have the remarkable ability to infer how an event might have unfolded differently, without
directly experiencing this alternative reality. We employ such counterfactual reasoning to make
sense of the past, plan courses of action, make emotional and social judgments, and guide adaptive
behavior. In this review article, we introduce an integrative cognitive neuroscience framework
for understanding the psychological and neural foundations of counterfactual thought, drawing
upon cognitive and neuroscience evidence to suggest that counterfactual thinking depends on an
integrative network of systems for affective processing, mental simulation, and cognitive control.
We begin by surveying the psychological literature on counterfactual reasoning,
followed by a review of the neuroscience literature on affective processing, mental
simulation, and cognitive control networks supporting counterfactual thought. Finally,
we review evidence to elucidate how these mechanisms are systematically altered in
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psychiatric illness and neurological disease and draw
conclusions about the importance of counterfactual thought
for understanding adaptive behavior and goal-directed decision
making.
Stages of Counterfactual Thought
We propose that counterfactual reasoning depends on three
processing stages: Activation, Inference, and Adaptation (see
Figure 1; e.g., Byrne, 2002; Epstude and Roese, 2008; Barbey
et al., 2009). To illustrate these stages, consider the example
of receiving a rejection letter for a new job. The letter would
activate prior memories (e.g., the process of submitting an
application and interviewing for the position) and elicit a
mental simulation of the event (e.g., representing relevant
knowledge and expectations; for example, the job requirements).
As this activation spreads, it triggers mental simulations of
similar situations (previous applications), allowing one to infer
how this scenario would have played out under different
circumstances (e.g., if one had spent more time preparing
for the interview; i.e., the counterfactual event). These nearby
counterfactual simulations influence ones interpretation of the
factual experience (e.g., the committees decision was caused
by my failure to adequately prepare for the interview) and
promote adaptive behavior that guides future planning and
problem solving. The process of counterfactual reasoning
therefore supports inferences about the factual event that guide
understanding, modulate emotional responses, and provide the
basis for future planning and decision-making.
Our proposal is that the coordination of systems for:
(i) mental simulation; (ii) inference; and (iii) learning and
adaptation together enable counterfactual reasoning. In the
following sections, we review each of these processes and survey
evidence from psychology and neuroscience to elucidate their
contributions to counterfactual reasoning.
Activation of Mental Simulations
Counterfactual thoughts are automatically employed in response
to real world experiences, in particular those situations where
negative emotions are linked to violations of expectations and
motivations (e.g., an unsuccessful job-application), in the form
of implicit or explicit goal failures (e.g., answering the interview
questions weakly), or close calls (physical, temporal or numerical
proximity; e.g., being the runner-up) trigger counterfactual
thoughts, representing a probable alternative state of affairs
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Davis et al., 1995; Sanna and
Turley, 1996; Roese and Olson, 1997; Mcgraw et al., 2005;
Epstude and Roese, 2008; Kühberger et al., 2011).
We propose that counterfactual thought depends on mental
models of alternative possibilities represented in the form of
mental simulations (Damasio, 1989; Barsalou et al., 2003a,b;
Markman et al., 2009). Simulations provide the basis for
constructing mental models of events and of imaging alternative
realities ‘‘if only’’ different decisions were made or actions taken.
For example, the counterfactual inference that ‘‘If I was to
vacation in Europe rather than continue writing, then I wouldn’t
be this stressed’’ activates a mental simulation, which represents
relevant agents (e.g., the author), objects (e.g., museums), actions
(e.g., sightseeing), mental states (e.g., freedom) and background
settings (e.g., Florence). These simulations provide the basis for
evaluating the consequences of the real and alternative courses of
action, with the simulation of the author ‘‘vacationing in Europe’’
resulting in being more relaxed but not completing the article.
Our proposal shares much in common with previous
frameworks of counterfactual reasoning, emphasizing the
generative/constructive nature of counterfactual thought. For
example, norm theory suggests that such reasoning is driven
by simulations of previously encoded exemplars (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). This theory
emphasized the role of counterfactual thought in reframing such
scenarios—generating alternative possibilities that change the
norms (and expectations) used to interpret a state of affairs.
TheModel Theory of counterfactual thought (Byrne, 2002, 2007)
emphasizes individuals’ ability to entertain multiple parallel
models corresponding to alternative possibilities, and suggests
that counterfactual thought is engaged to search the space of
possible alternatives (e.g., in simulating permissible or forbidden
actions). Building upon these frameworks, the structured event
complex theory proposes that counterfactual thought engages a
network of regions within prefrontal cortex (PFC) that represent
alternative goals, behavioral intentions, mindsets, motivations,
and self-inferences that enable behavioral change and adaptation
(Barbey et al., 2009).
Counterfactual Inference
In contrast to other types of conditional and hypothetical
reasoning, an important feature of counterfactual inference is
that it adheres to a ‘‘nearest possible world’’ constraint (Lewis,
1979, 1986; Hendrickson, 2010; Rafetseder et al., 2010, 2013;
Van Hoeck et al., 2012). A counterfactual must closely model
one’s own experience of the real state of the world. It ties
to specific situational features and prior knowledge of the
situation (i.e., it requires the fewest independent changes to
the actual circumstances and be maximal coherent with prior
history). This constraint differentiates counterfactual thought
from less constrained fantasy or imagination (Rao and Foo, 1989;
Lebow, 2000; Revlin et al., 2001; Roese and Summerville, 2005;
Byrne, 2007; Hendrickson, 2010; Dehghani et al., 2012). The
alternative outcome suggested by the counterfactual reflects a
small deviation from reality and is therefore probable (Over et al.,
2007; Epstude and Roese, 2008; Petrocelli et al., 2011).
For example, counterfactual thought often focuses on the
factor that: (1) played the strongest role in the (un-)desired
outcome; (2) deviated most from expectancies; or (3) is most
under the participants control (i.e., ‘‘mutable’’ factor; McCloy
and Byrne, 2000; Mcgraw et al., 2005; Byrne, 2007; Over
et al., 2007; Dehghani et al., 2012; Rips and Edwards, 2013).
Counterfactual thought rarely suggests alterations from natural
or social laws (Byrne, 1997, 2007; Roese, 1997; Nasco and
Marsh, 1999; McCloy and Byrne, 2000; Walsh and Byrne,
2004; Tykocinski and Steinberg, 2005; Dehghani et al., 2012).
Furthermore, counterfactual thought is tied to the meaning and
relevance of specific events rather than to general situations
or tendencies. Consider an example in which one failed an
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FIGURE 1 | Stages of counterfactual reasoning: a schematic overview.
exam by studying the wrong material. In this situation, the
generalization that studying promotes academic achievement is
unhelpful.
In addition to being tied to a specific event, counterfactual
thought is often motivated by a specific individual perspective.
An individuals’ implicit belief of attainability or self-efficacy
will play an important role (Sanna, 1997; Wong et al., 2012;
Dyczewski and Markman, 2012; Tyser et al., 2012; Zhang
and Covey, 2014). For example, an individual who studied
the wrong material for an exam would not believe they
would otherwise pass, failing to endorse the counterfactual,
‘‘If I had studied the correct material, I would have passed
the exam’’, when they held the implicit belief that they are
not smart enough to master the correct material. To this
individual, the semifactual, ‘‘Even if I had studied the correct
material, I would have failed the exam’’, would be more
realistic. Implicit belief can therefore explain why individuals
sometimes alter other aspects than their own behavior (e.g., task-
characteristics) when they are explicitly cued to generate
counterfactuals (Pighin et al., 2011; Ferrante et al.,
2013).
Learning and Adaptation
Once the counterfactual state of affairs has been inferred, this
information will be incorporated in the representation of the
factual state of affairs (re-evaluation) and update prior beliefs and
action-values, resulting in behavioral and affective consequences.
Counterfactual inference supports adaptive behavior and is
known to:
 Enhance memory distortions, such as hindsight bias and
source confusion (retrospective overestimation of the
outcome’s likelihood), contributing to suboptimal decision
making (e.g., investment practices; Roese and Olson, 1996;
Roese et al., 2004; Kruger et al., 2005; Nestler and von Collani,
2008; Petrocelli and Sherman, 2010; Petrocelli and Harris,
2011; Strahilevitz et al., 2011; Gerlach et al., 2013).
 Promote a relational/analytical or an expansive/creative
processing style (Markman et al., 2007).
 Enable learning from past experience (Byrne, 1997;
Epstude and Roese, 2008; Smallman and McCulloch,
2012) and the formation of behavioral intentions
(c.f., Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking;
Epstude and Roese, 2008).
 Support future planning and prediction (Roese, 1999; Barbey
and Sloman, 2007; Markman et al., 2008; Smallman and Roese,
2009; Tobia et al., 2014).
 Provide the basis for creativity and insight (Sternberg and
Gastel, 1989; Gomez Beldarrain et al., 2005; Markman et al.,
2007; Kray et al., 2009; Roese and Morrison, 2009).
 Impart meaning to important life events by increasing
perceptions of fate, benefit and growth (Davis et al., 1998; Koo
et al., 2008; Kray et al., 2010; Teigen and Jensen, 2011).
 Generate emotions and social ascriptions (e.g., guilt, regret,
blame and relief) that are central for managing and regulating
social behavior (Davis et al., 1995; Roese and Olson, 1997,
2007; Pieters and Zeelenberg, 2005; Alicke et al., 2008; Coricelli
and Rustichini, 2010; Brassen et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2013).
Several interacting factors influence the behavioral and
affective consequences of counterfactual inference. In the first
place the counterfactual outcome value will be important. Is
the alternative outcome better or worse (valence; upward vs.
downward counterfactual) and by how much (magnitude)?
This valuation will impact how an individual perceives the
factual, experienced outcome and its relative value. Secondly,
does the individual perceive a favorable opportunity to improve
performance? Will a similar situation take place in the future
(repeatability, e.g., midterm vs. final exams) and does the
individual believe it is feasible to change the outcome: do
they perceive to be in control of the situation and that the
counterfactual state is attainable? What is the probability that
the alternative action(s) can bring about the desired outcome?
The third factor is the perspective or processing mode in which
counterfactual states are represented. Markman and McMullen
(2003) suggest in their Reflective and Evaluative Model that
a counterfactual representation can be further processed in
two ways: the counterfactual representation can function as a
standard to which to compare the real world (evaluative mode)
or the counterfactual representation can be further processed in
a more concrete-experiential way without using it as a standard
of comparison (reflective mode). These different modes are
very similar to the distinction between imagining an event
from the first- vs. third-person perspective. From a first-person
perspective (similar to reflective mode), the individual imagines
an event as if it is unfolding before them (the individual is
part of the experience). However, when the event is imagined
from a third-person perspective (similar to evaluative mode),
the individual visualizes the event from an observer’s standpoint
and examines the broader context (Libby and Eibach, 2011a,b;
Valenti et al., 2011). This suggests that an evaluative focus takes
current beliefs, traits, and goals more into account, whereas
a reflective mode focuses more on sensory details of the
counterfactual representation. We now turn to a discussion of
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how the combination among the reviewed factors (i.e., value,
opportunity, and processing mode) influences counterfactual
inference.
Evaluations of how a counterfactual possibility could have
been better (i.e., upward counterfactual thoughts), and how
we might have personally effected such an outcome (perceived
attainability) often elicit an emotional and social reaction. For
example, regret will increase as we feel more responsible for
the outcome and as the discrepancy between the experienced
and counterfactual outcome value increases (Zeelenberg et al.,
1998; van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002; Nicolle et al., 2011b).
Like feelings of regret, the social ascription of blame arises
from counterfactual reasoning about an action that caused or
contributed to the negative experience and that is perceived to be
under the person’s control (see example about avoided car crash).
However, blame demands an additional negative evaluation of
the action itself (e.g., intentionally causing harm, breaking social
norms, negligence; i.e., culpable control; c.f. Alicke et al., 2008).
Counterfactual thinking combined with an opportunity
to improve future performance (repeatability of a similar
event and belief in feasibility of different outcome), elicits
behavioral motivations to pursue the counterfactual outcome,
and modulates ones perception of control and preparedness,
boosting persistence and performance (Roese and Olson, 1997;
Sanna, 1997; Nasco andMarsh, 1999; Markman andMiller, 2006;
Quelhas et al., 2008; Smallman and Roese, 2009; Dyczewski and
Markman, 2012; Smallman, 2013; Zhang and Covey, 2014). It
is assumed that the affect coupled with the experience will be
reappraised in light of ones new feelings, and inhibit further
counterfactual thoughts (Roese and Olson, 1997; Sanna, 1997;
McMullen and Markman, 2002; Quelhas et al., 2008; Libby and
Eibach, 2011b; Libby et al., 2011; Valenti et al., 2011). The
reappraisal of the situation might also explain why the emotional
intensity experienced during episodic counterfactual thinking is
lower than during episodic past and future thinking (De Brigard
and Giovanello, 2012).
However, in situations without opportunity for improvement
(e.g., if the change is infeasible or the scenario cannot reoccur),
upward counterfactual thinking will not be beneficial (Sanna,
1997; McMullen and Markman, 2002; Branscombe et al., 2003;
Alicke et al., 2008; McCrea, 2008; Libby and Eibach, 2011a;
Nicolle et al., 2011b; Dyczewski and Markman, 2012; Tyser
et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2012; Zhang and Covey, 2014).
Consider the case of breast cancer patients 3–4 months after
diagnosis. In this group a high level of upward counterfactual
thought is related to a high level of psychological distress
(Gilbar and Hevroni, 2007). During this phase of the illness
the shock of this life-threatening diagnosis is still being
processed, for which upward counterfactuals would not be not
helpful. Similar results have been found with assault-victims
(Branscombe et al., 2003; El Leithy et al., 2006). When one
perceives no favorable opportunities to obtain a desired outcome
or implement corrective behavior, goal disengagement is an
adaptive coping mechanism (Wrosch et al., 2013). As such,
downward counterfactual thoughts (i.e., thoughts about how the
event could have turned out worse) instead might help regulate
emotions in these circumstances and promote the inference that
an individual is a ‘‘lucky survivor’’ instead of an ‘‘unlucky victim’’
(Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Davis et al., 1998; Teigen and
Jensen, 2011).
Markman and McMullen (2003) suggest that counterfactual
information can also be processed in a more concrete,
experiential manner (see also Libby and Eibach, 2011a,b).
Effects of this processing match affective assimilation effects:
the experienced affect is pulled into the direction of the
counterfactual outcome. Processing an upward counterfactual in
this manner will yield more positive affect (less intense negative
emotions), but less behavioral benefits than evaluative upward
counterfactuals. Vividly imagining a worse counterfactual
outcome can instead lead to increase in negative affect, which can
enhance persistence and performance to avoid this potentially
worse outcome in the future (McMullen and Markman, 2000;
Markman et al., 2008).
While most of the cases outlined above result in persistent
behavioral change or re-evaluation of beliefs, not every instance
of counterfactual reasoning will result in a persistent or
positive behavioral change. Yet even in these cases, we suggest
that counterfactual reasoning may influence the outcome. For
example, if our counterfactual reasoning effort indicates a
change in behavior would not result in a more favorable
outcome, we still adapt our future behavior to this counterfactual
information. Thus, we argue that counterfactual reasoningmakes
an obligatorily contribution to learning, by providing alternative
realities from which to draw conclusions. Individuals therefore
adapt to counterfactuals as well as real feedback-and whether this
is ultimately helpful depends upon future experiences.
These diverse effects derive from essential characteristics of
counterfactual thought, resulting from the construction of a
coherent and plausible representation of a nearby alternative
that is maintained alongside an accurate representation
of the actual event. The engagement of attentional and
executive control processes enables comparison between
these parallel representations. This comparison ultimately drives
the evaluation of the final outcome and its contribution to
learning.
Thus, counterfactual thinking is a constructive process. It
draws for content upon general semantic knowledge, and specific
memories of past experiences. It requires spatial and temporal
integration of the elements of experience. It utilizes working
memory in the storage and manipulation of items. It requires
emotional processing, and integrates motivations and goals.
These higher cognitive functions interact to construct an internal
representation of the target scenario.
Neural Networks
We review neuroscience evidence to elucidate three neural
networks that together support counterfactual thought: (1)
the mental simulation network; (2) the cognitive control
network; and (3) the reward network (see Figure 2). As
such counterfactual reasoning is supported by ‘‘networks that
underlie domain general functions that cut across different
psychological domains’’ (Barrett and Satpute, 2013). It is the
interaction between these networks that make the complex
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FIGURE 2 | Neural networks supporting counterfactual reasoning:
a schematic overview. CF, counterfactual; mPFC, medial prefrontal
cortex; IPL, inferior partietal lobe; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; LTL,
lateral temporal lobe; aI, anterior insula; plOFC, posterior lateral
orbitofrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventral mPFC; dmPFC, dorsal mPFC. For
generating the brain image example of the emotion and value processing
network we made use of the neursynth.org database (see also Yarkoni
et al., 2011).
psychological phenomena of counterfactual reasoning, including
its effect on our behavior and emotions, possible. This view
indicates that there is no distinctive ‘‘counterfactual reasoning’’
network nor that there is a one-on-one association between
one of the processing stages of counterfactual reasoning we
discussed above and one specific neural network. However, the
engagement of these interactive networks, and regions within
it (e.g., hippocampus or amygdala) depend on the type and
amount of information that needs to be processed at a particular
time.
Mental Simulation Network
Counterfactual thought engages a neural network that supports
core processes for mentally undoing the present state of affairs
and imagining alternative realities ‘‘if only’’ different decisions
were made or actions taken (e.g., Nieuwland, 2012; Urrutia
et al., 2012; De Brigard et al., 2013; Kulakova et al., 2013;
Van Hoeck et al., 2013, 2014). This mental simulation network,
also called the default mode network, engages regions in the
medial frontal and temporal lobes, the posterior cingulate cortex,
precuneus, and the lateral parietal and temporal lobes. This
network is active when individuals are engaged in internally
focused tasks, self-projection and scene construction, including
autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the future, and
conceiving the perspectives of others (e.g., Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng
and Grady, 2010; Summerfield et al., 2010; Schacter et al.,
2012, 2015; Spreng and Mar, 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013).
Thus, this network is engaged when a situation is observed
and interpreted, mentally altered and re-evaluated (i.e., all
stages of counterfactual thought). Medial temporal lobe regions,
such as the hippocampus, provide information from prior
experiences in the form of memories and associations that are
the core building blocks of mental simulation. Medial PFC
regions facilitate the flexible use of this information during
the construction of self-relevant mental simulations. These
two subnetworks converge on important nodes of integration
including the posterior cingulate cortex. Here we review
emerging neuroscience evidence linking counterfactual thought
to this network’s function.
Van Hoeck et al. (2010, 2013) directly compared past, future
and counterfactual simulations of episodic events (i.e., specific
personal experienced events) in this fMRI study. Healthy college
students performed three tasks: (1) Recall a negative past event
(e.g., ‘‘Imagine/recall the car accident from your holiday in
France’’); (2) Imagine how a similar future event turns out
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positive instead (e.g., ‘‘Imagine a future car trip that goes
well’’); and (3) Imagine how the past event might have turned
out better (a positive upward counterfactual) given a specific
additive counterfactual action (e.g., ‘‘Imagine what would have
happened if you had paid more attention to the road during
that car trip in France’’). Extensive neural overlap between
these tasks was expected and observed. Episodic past, future
and counterfactual simulation commonly activated the mental
simulation network. But compared to past episodic thinking in
particular, counterfactual simulation of episodic events engaged
the mental simulation network to a larger extend (see Van
Hoeck et al., 2013 for more information). Similar results were
also documented by De Brigard et al. (2013), who likewise
compared episodic past and counterfactual simulation. This
stronger engagement might be understood as counterfactual
thinking being a more complex or strenuous form of mental
simulation, whereby both factual as counterfactual elements need
to be represented and inferred.
A follow-up study conducted by Van Hoeck et al. (2014)
demonstrated that counterfactual reasoning about hypothetical
social scenarios engage this mental simulation network as well.
Participants read a short scenario involving two agents, one of
whom moved an object (e.g., moving a wallet from place to
place) or changed the content or characteristics of an object
(e.g., changing the contents of the wallet). Participants made
counterfactual inferences (e.g., what if the object had not been
moved?), false belief inferences (e.g., what would the absent agent
expect?), and conditional inferences (e.g., what used to be in
the wallet?). All three types of inference engaged the mental
simulation network, confirming the general role of this network
in the construction of mental representations.
During episodic counterfactual simulation the engagement
of ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) probably supports
the construction of the ‘‘nearest possible world’’ by inferring
relevant information from prior experience and background
beliefs. vmPFC can also integrate the information from the
constructed counterfactual event into existing representations,
updating prior expectations and action-value associations, which
serve to guide future behavior (see vmPFC/mOFC discussion
in ‘‘Emotion and Value Processing Network’’ Section). This
integration of counterfactual simulations with memory processes
can also explain how counterfactual inference can contribute
to false memories (e.g., De Brigard, 2013; Gerlach et al., 2013).
Indeed, vmPFC involvement during counterfactual simulation
may depend on the subject’s engagement in affective, self-
reflective inference making (see also D’Argembeau et al., 2013).
We suggest that the hippocampus is more likely to be
engaged during counterfactual thinking in situations requiring
extensive arbitrary relational binding (Nieuwland, 2012; Urrutia
et al., 2012; De Brigard et al., 2013; Kulakova et al., 2013;
Van Hoeck et al., 2013, 2014). For example, when objects
are randomly arranged on a table, the hippocampus will be
more critically involved in remembering which object went in
which location (location is not an inherent charateristic of an
object, since objects can be moved and any could be bound
to any location; therefore this arbitrary relationship needs to
be encoded), than it would be involved in reconstructing the
general gestalt of the figure formed by the objects (this could
be mapped to semantic knowledge for ‘‘squares’’ or ‘‘triangles’’
c.f. Watson et al., 2013). Previous work indeed indicates that
the hippocampal memory network (e.g., parahippocampal gyrus,
fusiform gyrus, perirhinal cortex, vmPFC) is more strongly
activated when elements that were previously not related are
bound together, for instance, during novel scenario simulation
or the generation of new concepts (Hassabis et al., 2007; Addis
et al., 2009; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Summerfield et al.,
2009; Maguire and Hassabis, 2011; Zeithamova et al., 2012;
Maguire and Mullally, 2013; Van Mulukom et al., 2013; Watson
et al., 2013). During the construction of counterfactual scenarios
the hippocampus will be enganged when information about
the relations between elements of the scenario cannot be easily
inferred from prior knowledge (Henke, 2010). The more changes
we make to prior history (e.g., the remembered or experienced
event) while creating the counterfacutal representation the
more the hippocampus is involved. The hippocampus’ role in
scene-construction and relational binding also explains why
constructing a future episode, and not always a counterfactual
episode (which adheres to the ‘‘nearest possible world’’
constraint), engaged the hippocampal area more strongly than
constructing a past episode (Addis and Schacter, 2012; Van
Hoeck et al., 2013).
That counterfactual reasoning is strongly constraint by prior
knowledge explains the increased engagement of the lateral
temporal lobe (Nieuwland, 2012; Urrutia et al., 2012; Van
Hoeck et al., 2013, 2014). This is often interpreted as an
engagement of semantic processing, using general knowledge to
construct the counterfactual scenario rather than information
tied to a particular event or arbitrary configuration of elements
(Addis et al., 2009; Viard et al., 2011; Irish et al., 2012;
Schacter et al., 2012; De Brigard et al., 2013). Counterfactual
reasoning that involves many layers of contextual abstraction
(Gilead et al., 2012) may engage dorsal mPFC (dmPFC;
Scott et al., 2003; Binder et al., 2009; Urrutia et al., 2012;
Baetens et al., 2013; Van Hoeck et al., 2013, 2014). Goal-
directed behavior, a common component of counterfactual
thought, have been shown to engage inferior partietal lobe
(IPL) and premotor cortex (Glover, 2004; Gazzola and Keysers,
2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Moody and Gennari,
2010; Stosic et al., 2014). It is worth emphasizing that
because the content of counterfactual scenarios varies, so
too will the engagement of different brain networks. For
example, when there is a strong social component present
in the situation we can expect the temporo-parietal junction
to be more engaged. This in contrast to when the social
component is absent and instead there is a stronger focus
on a contextual and goal-directed action component (IPL).
Depending upon the level of detail required, the number of
relations between elements to configure, and the connection to
specific or general events, different counterfactual paradigms
will elicit slightly different configurations of the mental
simulation network. The contribution of mental simulations
to counterfactual reasoning then is in the construction and
updating of an accurate representation of the scenario in
question. Manipulation, reasoning, and decision making that
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 July 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 420
Van Hoeck et al. Counterfactual reasoning
follow from that representation tend to engage other cognitive
control regions, which we turn to now.
Cognitive Control Networks
Although it has never been the direct focus of a neuroscience
study on counterfactual reasoning, we can assume that
counterfactual thinking engages cognitive control and reasoning
processes, and the outcomes of these processes contribute
to overt and covert behavior regulation. We discuss two
main control networks, the fronto-parietal network and the
cingulo-opercular network, that have been engaged during
counterfactual reasoning. We suggest that these networks:
(1) enable switching between immediate experiences and
counterfactual scenarios; (2) perform the mental transforms
required for counterfactual inference and reasoning; and (3)
monitor and update representations of the relative values of
actions to steer subsequent behavior.
Fronto-Parietal Control Network
The fronto-parietal control network consists of the lateral
PFC (lPFC), middle cingulate cortex, IPL and precuneus.
This network enables the integration of multiple sources of
information and supports the regulation and control of thought
and behavior (e.g., Miller and Cohen, 2001; Seeley et al., 2007;
Dosenbach et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2010;
Spreng and Grady, 2010; Shackman et al., 2011; Barbey et al.,
2012, 2013; Cabeza et al., 2012; Chein and Schneider, 2012;
Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng, 2012; Whitman et al., 2013). The
IPL and dorsal lateral PFC (dlPFC) play an important role
in simulating and processing counterfactual information (e.g.,
Coricelli et al., 2005, 2007; Chua et al., 2009; Fujiwara et al., 2009;
Van Hoeck et al., 2010, 2014; Nieuwland, 2012; Xue et al., 2012;
De Brigard et al., 2013), but this representational role seems to be
in service of executive, goal-directed functions. For example, the
dlPFC (and posterior parietal cortex) wasmore strongly activated
when processing information related to counterfactual outcomes,
especially in situations with mixed appraisals (e.g., although you
won, you could have won more; c.f. Henderson and Norris,
2013). In addition, the left dlPFC plays a central role in the
manipulation of cognitive representations in the service of goal-
directed behavior (Barbey et al., 2009, 2013; Ruh et al., 2012).
Knight and Grabowecky (1995; p. 1367) provide evidence
from a patient with dlPFC damage who demonstrated a
‘‘complete absence of counterfactual expression’’. Likewise,
Gomez Beldarrain et al. (2005) observed significantly fewer
spontaneous counterfactual thoughts in a group of dlPFC
and orbital frontal cortex (OFC) lesion patients. However,
these patients were able to construct hypothetical scenarios in
response to specific cues, emphasizing the distinction between
the mental simulation network and the more outcome-oriented,
comparative PFC network.
Cingulo-Opercular Control Network
The cingulo-opercular network includes the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC), the posterior medial frontal cortex
(pmFC), anterior insula (aI)/frontal operculum (posterior lateral
OFC), and the anterior PFC (aPFC). This network is consistently
linked to maintaining task goals and monitoring actions, as
well as contributing to slow behavioral adjustments over time
(e.g., Seeley et al., 2007; Dosenbach et al., 2008; Power et al.,
2011; Chein and Schneider, 2012). For example, Boorman et al.
(2011) provide evidence that activity within this network (pmFC
and aPFC) positively correlates with the reward-probability of
a counterfactual choice option. Lateral aPFC activation also
correlated positively with the reward-probability of the most
favorable counterfactual option, and negatively with worst
counterfactual option, suggesting that the lateral aPFC encodes
and updates information associated with the best alternative and
provides a signal for switching to an advantageous alternative
(Boorman et al., 2009, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011). These
results fit well with previous findings of pmPFC involvement
in adaptive behavior during tasks that entail performance
monitoring, decision related uncertainty, and detection of
response conflict and unfavorable outcomes (Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Danielmeier et al., 2011). Similarly, in an episodic
counterfactual simulation task, lOFC and aI activity is associated
with increasing evidence of the counterfactual simulation’s
probability (De Brigard et al., 2013). This finding helps to explain
why lOFC activation increased in a stimuli-identification task
when subjects were aware that their upcoming performance
would not be rewarded (there are better opportunities/trials
out there) and vice versa (Ursu and Carter, 2005). Together
these results suggest that the cingulo-opercular network critically
contributes to behavioral regulation and feelings of regret
by updating and maintaining counterfactual action-outcome
information and signaling when it becomes profitable to change
behavior (Liu et al., 2007; Nicolle et al., 2011b; Hampshire et al.,
2012; Rudebeck et al., 2013).
Emotion and Value Processing Network
We have reviewed evidence to elucidate the neural mechanisms
that support the construction of counterfactual scenarios and
for evaluating and switching between these nearby possible
realties to guide behavior toward rewarding alternatives. We now
turn to the question of where these evaluative and rewarding
signals originate: the networks underlying emotional and
value processing traditionally associated with affective learning,
valuation, reward processing, and autonomic/endocrine control
(for an extensive overview see Roy et al., 2012). These networks
include the vmPFC (including the medial orbitofrontal cortex,
mOFC), amygdala, basal ganglia, lOFC and lPFC. We selectively
review neuroscience studies that provide insight into how this
network supports each of the central affect-related components
of the counterfactual reasoning process (see especially the
activation and adaptation-stage).
The amygdaloid complex is most frequently associated
with emotional arousal and evaluative judgments (Berntson
et al., 2011), especially in integrating sensory and associative
information to process negative stimuli (e.g., LeDoux, 2000;
Dolan, 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phelps, 2006; Lewis
et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Bzdok et al., 2013; Denny et al.,
2013). In addition, while the amygdala is important for reflexive
or unconscious emotional processing, it is also involved in
judgments of self awareness and personal responsibility (Sander
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et al., 2003; Li et al., 2011; Nicolle et al., 2011b; Zalla and Sperduti,
2013). For example, Nicolle et al. (2011b) demonstrated that the
amygdala responded to receiving the worse outcome from two
gamble-options (counterfactual outcome was better) when these
were associated with high, vs. low, personal responsibility.
Encoding the relative value of the obtained outcome of
an event is supported by components of the basal ganglia
and aI/plOFC. In a sequential decision—making study
that asked subjects to invest money in a market based on
its history (D’Ardenne et al., 2013), Blood Oxygen Level
Dependent (BOLD) activity in two dopaminergic basal
ganglia structures (the substantia nigra and the ventral
tegmental area) was positively correlated with the relative
values of the obtained outcome (the difference with prior
expectations and with the counterfactual outcome). The
BOLD response in these regions also tracked the influence
of these relative values on subsequent behavior, indicating
their contribution to experiential and counterfactual
learning.
Further upstream in the dopaminergic pathway, striatum
activity has been associated with approach motivation:
encoding the degree of ‘‘wanting’’ of ‘‘liking’’ particular
outcomes, displaying activation when relative outcome
values favor an upcoming decision (i.e., no change of
decision—making behavior is needed; current plan of action
is favorable) and a stronger deactivation with increasing
evidence against current action (i.e., change of decision
making is needed; alternative/counterfactual actions need
to be considered; Büchel et al., 2011; Nicolle et al., 2011a;
Palminteri et al., 2012; D’Ardenne et al., 2013; Henderson
and Norris, 2013; Tobia et al., 2014). aI/plOFC activity, on
the other hand, is associated with sub-optimal evaluations
(relative loss or threatening), contributing to feelings of
regret and promoting corrective behavior (O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Chua et al., 2009; Henderson and Norris,
2013). The aI/plOFC has also been implicated in encoding
unanticipated avoidance of negative outcome (relief) and may
thus in general contribute to assignment of evaluative value
(Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; Berntson et al., 2011; Palminteri
et al., 2012).
Patients with lesions in frontal regions demonstrate
this interplay of action-value associations. Levens et al.
(2014) examined plOFC and vmPFC/mOFC lesion patients’
ability to generate reward expectations prior to making
a decision and to assign a value to each outcome once
the decision was made. Patients selected between two
alternative ‘‘wheels of fortune’’ gambles. Each gamble had
two possible outcomes (win or lose) with different reward-
probabilities. This task doubly dissociated the behavior of
patients with damage in the posterior lOFC from patients with
vmPFC/mOFC damage. Patients with damage confined to
plOFC successfully generated reward expectations and used
them to calculate the expected value of each choice but were
impaired in processing post-decision feedback in favor of
the counterfactual choice option. By contrast, patients with
vmPFC/mOFC damage selected financially worse gambles,
demonstrating difficulty in computing expected value but their
post-decision affect reflected both the true and counterfactual
outcomes.
These findings illustrate the distinction between
assigning/learning evaluative value (undergirded by aI/plOFC)
and the computation of expected values (vmPFC/mOFC). The
literature broadly supports vmPFC/mOFC involvement in
inferring the affective meaning of a situation by connecting
conceptual information (based on personal prior experiences,
beliefs, traits, and goals) with its subjective value (e.g., Coricelli
et al., 2007; Van Overwalle, 2011; D’Argembeau and Salmon,
2012; Roy et al., 2012; D’Argembeau et al., 2013; Moore et al.,
2014; Zaki et al., 2014). Through these value associations,
vmPFC/mOFC can represent specific expectations about
the outcome of an event and update these representations
in light of new information (e.g., expectancy violations of
counterfactual outcome values; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Alexander
and Brown, 2011; Tobia et al., 2014). These findings indicate
that vmPFC/mOFC abnormalities result in impairments in
expectation-based regulation of emotions and behavior (Mellers
et al., 1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Levens et al., 2014). This
is generally consistent with the role of vmPFC/mOFC in the
top-down modulation of emotional responses by ascribing
affective meaning to the sensory information processed in the
amygdaloid complex (Coricelli et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2009;
Kim et al., 2011; Zalla and Sperduti, 2013).
Taken together, these networks provide a basis for the
diverse emotional and evaluative processing required during
counterfactual thought.
Clinical Considerations
While these cognitive and neuropsychological studies have begun
to treat counterfactual thought as an important part of human
reasoning, little is known about how counterfactual thought is
altered by psychiatric illness and neurological disease. We now
turn to a review of the literature on counterfactual impairments
and brain networks in clinical populations, including individuals
with psychopathy, depression, schizophrenia and Parkinson’s
disease, and propose, in each case, that patients demonstrate
systematic impairments in the cognitive and neural mechanisms
for counterfactual inference.
Psychopathy
Psychopathic traits can be parsed into at least two interrelated
components, the affective-interpersonal features (Factor 1; e.g.,
callousness, lack of empathy or emotional depth, and lack of
genuine remorse) and the impulsive-antisocial traits (Factor 2;
e.g., aggression). The former Factor one traits distinguish
psychopathy from other antisocial syndromes and make people
with such traits particularly pernicious (e.g., prone to repeated
violence despite sanctions).
Adults with psychopathic traits display normal executive
functions but decreased arousal for aversive stimuli and aberrant
moral behavior (Koenigs et al., 2012; Young et al., 2012),
possibly exacerbated by abnormalities in selective attention:
ignoring elements outside their central focus of attention (early
bottleneck; Baskin-Sommers and Newman, 2013). In addition,
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Blair (1995) suggests that because individuals with psychopathic
traits lack the emotional responses that lead ordinary people
to imbue moral rules with genuine, authority-independent
moral legitimacy, they fail to distinguish between moral and
conventional rules and see all rules as mere rules. This indicates
that, especially during goal-pursuit (focused attention), immoral
behavior will not produce regular emotional arousal and/or will
be evaluated differently. These affective and moral value related
deficits have been connected with abnormal shape, size, activity
and connectivity of regions of the emotion and value processing
network and of the cognitive control networks (Blair, 2007;
Glenn et al., 2009, 2012; Koenigs et al., 2011; Motzkin et al., 2011;
Koenigs, 2012; Marazziti et al., 2013).
Within a framework of counterfactual thought, we argue that
adults with psychopathic traits demonstrate deficits primarily
attributable to abnormalities within the emotion and value
processing network chiefly related to amygdala and vmPFC.
These individuals are likely to exhibit decreased arousal for
negative stimuli and abnormal selective attention (reducing the
saliency of a rule violation), which will avert the activation of
counterfactual inference. Individuals with psychopathic traits
may assign a different affective meaning to immoral behavior,
impacting the content of the counterfactuals they construe (e.g.,
focusing on the victim). As a result of a reduced spontaneous
elicitation of counterfactual thought and different counterfactual
content, they may report less remorse and self-blame and
correct their immoral behavior less frequently. We predict that
these deficits will exist in the presence of largely intact mental
simulation and executive processes, except where those processes
interact with the impaired moral or emotional processing.
Depression
Depression is a mood disorder characterized by feelings of
sadness, apathy and ruminative thoughts (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000). Rumination shares many features with counterfactual
thought. Rumination can be described as a stable thought
process that is repetitive, general, self-focused and oriented
toward negative emotions whereby the trigger and content
likely involve the discrepancy between the desired and actual
state of affairs (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,
2008; Watkins, 2008; Smith and Alloy, 2009). However, it
is still unclear how rumination and counterfactual reasoning
are related to each other (many rumination measures include
‘‘regret’’—a counterfactual emotion- as an item). There is some
evidence speaking to the mood related changes occurring during
counterfactual thought in individuals with depressive symptoms.
A study conducted by Quelhas et al. (2008; Experiment 2)
demonstrated that, immediately after receiving a negative grade
on an academic test, college students with moderate symptoms
of depression (measured by Beck Depression Inventory [BDI];
MBDI−II = 18.95) generated a smaller number of spontaneous
counterfactual thoughts relative to controls (MBDI−II = 3.08).
This difference was eliminated by an explicit cue to generate
upward counterfactuals regarding a recent negative academic
experience (Markman and Miller, 2006). In addition, upward
counterfactuals generated by individuals with symptoms of
depression and controls, had similar levels of focus on
controlling the situation by changing one’s own behavior. What
differed was the feasibility of counterfactuals generated by
the depression group: their alternative scenarios included less
plausible actions and/or actions less likely to change the outcome.
Depression severity also influenced number of counterfactuals
focused on chronic or enduring aspects of the self (which
are unlikely to change or be under immediate control). In
addition, consistent with the earlier statement that processing
upward counterfactuals with low feasibility only contributes to
psychological distress but does not result in beneficial reappraisal
effects, the post-counterfactual mood of depression groups was
more negative than controls. Moreover, subjects with mild-to-
moderate symptoms (BDI-II cutoff: 10–23) did not perceive an
increase in their ability to exert control over the environment (see
also Quelhas et al., 2008) and in the severe group (BDI-II cutoff:
24+) the perception of control decreased and re-evaluation of
the event produced a more negative assessment than before the
counterfactual thinking.
The altered spontaneous counterfactual inference pattern in
depression might be related to other irregularities associated
with depression, including deficits in removing negative stimuli
from short-term memory (Joormann and Gotlib, 2010) and
decreased attentional control when confronted with self-relevant
negative information (De Raedt et al., 2010; Koster et al.,
2011; Beckwé et al., 2013), which might prevent them from
disengaging from their immediate emotional experience and
ruminative thought and reallocating resources and attention to
the (next) counterfactual inference process of how the event
could have unfolded differently (Dolcos et al., 2008; Iordan et al.,
2013). In addition, their rumination tendencies and overgeneral
autobiographical memory may also contribute to generating
counterfactuals that focus stronger on enduring traits than on
specific behavior (Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007; Watkins,
2008; Sumner, 2012).
Depression may also impact processing of counterfactual
information when the experimenter provides this information,
rather than it being a product of an individual’s own
counterfactual construction. Subjects with mild symptoms of
depression (MBDI = 14.66) reported more regret about a
hypothetical hiring decision than controls when they were
informed about another, better applicant (Monroe et al., 2005).
This increase in regret was not driven by the absolute difference
in applicant quality or by the individual’s initial confidence in
the hiring decision. Howlett and Paulus (2013) attributed this
increased experience of regret in subjects with mild-to-moderate
symptoms to: (1) an increased vigilance for potential threats to
self-esteem, indicating that negative stimuli are associated with a
high self-relevancy and thus increase their affective meaning; (2)
a stronger decrease of the relative value of the obtained outcome;
and (3) increased damage to self-esteem when considering a
better counterfactual alternative.
However, major depression disorder displays a different
emotional profile, wherein sensitivity to relative losses (e.g., one
could have won more) is muted and this response is related
to self-reported apathy-scores (Chase et al., 2010). This might
reflect changes in approach motivation and goal-processing
(Shankman et al., 2007; Eddington et al., 2009), and suggests
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that this disengagement might be related to coping mechanisms
developed to protect their unstable self-esteem (Roese et al., 2009;
Howlett and Paulus, 2013). This pattern of results might also be
linked to the finding that individuals’ with severe symptoms of
depression, when cued to generate counterfactual scenarios, tend
to construe less feasible, non-beneficial upward counterfactuals
(focused on chronic or enduring aspects of the self instead of
actions that would likely change the outcome), and experience
afterwards a more negative mood than controls (Markman and
Miller, 2006). In this case, disengaging from counterfactual
reasoning may prevent increased psychological distress (Wrosch
and Miller, 2009; Brassen et al., 2012; Wrosch et al., 2013), but
may also prevent improvement from status-quo (see Tykocinski
and Steinberg, 2005).
The literature on the neurobiology of depression is complex,
with differences related to severity, time of onset, and chronicity.
Changes are most consistently observed in emotion and value
processing regions, such as amygdala, vmPFC, striatum and
OFC (Johnstone et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2007; Eddington
et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2009; Townsend et al., 2010;
Murray et al., 2011; Price and Drevets, 2012; Howlett and
Paulus, 2013; Cole et al., 2014). Depression has also been
associated with increased connectivity between and alterations
within the aforementioned mental simulation network (e.g.,
Zhang et al., 2011). For example, severity of depression
correlates positively with activity in ventromedial polar cortex
and amygdala, possibly representing an increased vigilance for
potential threats to self-esteem (Drevets, 2007; Murray et al.,
2011; Price and Drevets, 2012). On the other hand, activity
within the posterior OFC, a region we identified as playing a key
role in processing counterfactual action-outcome information,
decreases with severity. This finding is largely consistent with
data from posterior OFC lesions patients indicating that damage
to this region influences expectations about their post-decision
affect but not for the counterfactual outcome (Levens et al., 2014).
In summary, depression symptoms seem to interfere with
all three aspects of counterfactual thought: mental simulation,
executive control and valuation. This interference is complex,
and interacts with severity, chronicity, and onset of time
of depression. Disruption is especially apparent for negative
and self-relevant judgments, such as disengaging from self-
relevant negative experiences. However, looking at depression
symptoms through a lens of counterfactual thinking helps to
identify disruptions that would not be immediately apparent
from an evaluation of depression as a mood disorder alone.
For example, subjects’ generation of less feasible, likely, or
detached counterfactuals is highly characteristic of depression
but not closely linked to mood. Counterfactual thought
can therefore provide a useful technique for understanding
depressive pathology and symptoms.
Schizophrenia and Parkinson’s Disease
Schizophrenia and Parkinson disease patients both exhibit
primary deficits in executive functions and social cognition,
stemming from disruptions within dopaminergic pathways
in the brain. We discuss similarities in the impairments of
counterfactual thought exhibited by these clinical groups.
Schizophrenia, a psychopathology with significant
neurological dysfunction and symptoms including auditory
hallucinations, paranoia, and other delusional thoughts, is
also known to impair counterfactual thinking. Hooker et al.
(2000) had 14 residential Schizophrenia patients (11 males and
3 females taking antipsychotic medication; with no history of
substance abuse, head injury or co-morbid Axis one disorder)
recall a negative personal event from the past year. They
were explicitly asked if, as they recalled the past, they had
any thoughts about how this event could have turned out
differently. In comparison to healthy controls, schizophrenia
patients mentioned fewer different counterfactual thoughts
(see also Caño et al., 2011). Their performance could not be
explained by a generalized cognitive deficit: in comparison
to the control subjects they did not differ on Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R) measure of Vocabulary and Digit
Span, or on the FAS Verbal Fluency test (verbal production). Key
components for counterfactual simulations are broadly impaired
by Schizophrenia. Research on episodic simulation indicate that
these patients are impaired in the coherent recall of episodic
events, inferring self-relevant meaning, and (re)construction
of episodic future scenarios (D’Argembeau et al., 2008; Raffard
et al., 2010a,b; Bennouna-Greene et al., 2012).
In addition, deficits in cognitive control may aggravate these
problems (Cole et al., 2014). Savla et al. (2012) examined the
performance of patients on measures of cognitive flexibility
and abstraction (Silver and Bilker, 2013). Decreased cognitive
flexibility was related to increase of positive symptoms associated
with schizophrenia. This factor also includes failures of inhibition
and control of attention (Clark et al., 2010; Goldberg et al.,
2011; Waters et al., 2012). Furthermore, abstraction correlated
negatively with the duration of illness and positively with
everyday functioning. These results suggest broad impairments
in counterfactual thought involving both failures to simulate and
regulate counterfactual scenarios.
Consistent with this pattern of results, Schizophrenia patients
display impairments the Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT;
Hooker et al., 2000; Larquet et al., 2010). The CIT assesses
social cognition across four vignettes, each of which describes a
negative event in which two protagonists differ in their proximity
to a better outcome or the normality of the action preceding the
negative outcome (routine vs. uncommon action). To illustrate,
consider the following example. ‘‘Janet is attacked by a mugger
only 10 feet from her house. Susan is attacked only a mile from
her house. Who is more upset by the mugging? (a) Janet (b)
Susan (c) Same/Cant’ tell’’ (Hooker et al., 2000, p. 330). Subjects
were asked to judge whom of the two protagonists felt worse
after experiencing this event, regrets their action the most, or
thinks most (counterfactually) about the event. Schizophrenia
patients were near chance in selecting appropriate CIT answers.
Their performance could not be explained by a generalized
cognitive deficit (WAIS-R: Vocabulary and Digit Span; FAS
Verbal Fluency test). However, performance on CIT did mediate
the group difference in social competence (measured by the
Zigler scale). In addition, patients showed decreased activity in
brain networks associated with reasoning about the cognitive
states of others (i.e., Theory of Mind; temporo-parietal junction,
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mPFC and lower portion of the precuneus; Amodio and Frith,
2006; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Mar, 2011; Schilbach
et al., 2012) during completion of false belief tasks (which
require inferring others’ representations of reality, which does
not correspond with their own perception reality; Lee et al.,
2011). The observed pattern of findings suggest that Theory of
Mind is not in general impaired in Schizophrenia, but that it
instead reflects deficits in reasoning when complex non-factual
elements are needed to understand the social environment
(Kern et al., 2009; Sparks et al., 2010). Both counterfactual and
false belief inference entail simulation of an alternative state of
affairs different from the perceived reality. Van Hoeck et al.
(2014) further confirmed that false belief and counterfactual
inference about social hypothetical scenarios activate the mental
simulation and frontoparietal networks (see also Canessa et al.,
2009). These authors further suggest that additive counterfactual
inference may reflect a more complex process that places
additional demands on cognitive control (increased activation in
dlPFC and pmFC).
An abundance of neuroscience studies confirm abnormalities
within the simulation and cognitive control networks, especially
those regions supporting contextual coherence, relational
processing and flexible cognitive control. For example, structural,
functional, and neurochemical hippocampus abnormalities have
been associated with Schizophrenia, therefore contributing
to observed problems in scene-construction and relational
processing during episodic simulation (Ongür et al., 2006;
Boyer et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2010; Adriano et al., 2012;
Herold et al., 2013). dmPFC, a region involved in contextual
associations/abstractions and contributing to the coherency
of the mental representation, shows altered interactions with
vmPFC and posterior midline structures in Schizophrenia
(Raffard et al., 2009; Shad et al., 2011; Alonso-Solís et al.,
2012), and also decreased anticorrelation with the dlPFC, a
frontoparietal control component (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al.,
2009).
Similar disruptions are found in Parkinson patients.
Parkinson is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder associated
with substantial decrease in dopamine levels in the basal
ganglia, frontal lobes and hippocampus. As in the case of
Schizophrenia, Parkinson patients demonstrate Theory of
Mind dysfunction (especially with respect to the cognitive
component; Yu and Wu, 2013), impaired cognitive flexibility,
selective attention and concept formation (Kudlicka et al., 2011).
Parkinson patients, in comparison to age-matched controls, also
generate a smaller number of upward episodic counterfactual
thoughts and demonstrate decreased performance on the CIT
(at chance level; McNamara et al., 2003). Their counterfactual
performance could not be explained by a general cognition
deficit, but did correlate with social function and cognitive
flexibility (as assessed by Stroop color inference task: inhibition,
resistance to cognitive interference; Tower of London task:
ill-structured problem space requiring planning and working
memory).
Thus, evidence from psychology and neuroscience
demonstrate impairments in the mental simulation and
executive function components of counterfactual thought in
Schizophrenia and Parkinson disease. Both patient groups
demonstrate impairments in cognitive flexibility, contextual
abstraction and relational binding. These deficits are especially
apparent within complex, ill-structured environments, and in the
context of goal-directed behavior and adaptive decision making.
Since all of these functions are required in counterfactual
thought, tests of counterfactual thinking may, once again, serve
as a valuable diagnostic tool.
Conclusion
Counterfactual reasoning entails three processing stages:
Activation, Inference and Adaptation. Counterfactual scenarios
are automatically constructed in response to everyday events
and are linked to violations of prior beliefs and motivations,
adhering to a ‘‘nearest possible world’’ constraint. These mental
simulations influence our emotional responses and future
behavior, by integrating information about the counterfactual
state of affairs into the representation of the current situation,
prior beliefs, and expectations thereby allowing one to learn
through counterfactual inference. This complex psychological
phenomena of counterfactual reasoning is made possible by
the coordinated interaction between three networks: (1) mental
simulation in MTL/PFC; (2) cognitive control in the fronto-
parietal and cingulo-opercular network; and (3) motivation and
valuation in limbic regions and vmPFC.
Because counterfactual reasoning depends upon so many
inter-related brain systems and mental processes, it provides
a broad window onto global brain function. Disruptions
to counterfactual reasoning are a productive scientific and
diagnostic tool. By identifying the specific sub-components of
counterfactual reasoning that are affected clinicians can better
understand the day-to-day challenges faced by different patient
populations. In our everyday lives, counterfactual reasoning is a
ubiquitous source of new insights into nearby possible worlds,
and different circumstances, scientific understanding of this
process is a critical component of insight into the complex
alternate worlds that make up our rich, inner lives.
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